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The Efficient Breach Theory in
International Investment Law
Sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi*
Abstract
When a State unilaterally abrogates its contractual obligations, it is under a
duty to compensate the investor. The aim of the compensation regime under
International Investment Law is to restore the investor to a position he or she
would have been in had the breach not taken place. Thus, the award of
compensation should not only include sunk costs (damnum emergens) but also
lost future profits (lucrum cessans).
In this article it is argued that the rules relating to compensation promote
efficiency, as per the ‘efficient breach theory’ because they dissuade
governments from unilaterally abrogating concession agreements, unless they
can compensate the investor, including lost future profits, whilst making some
money on top of that. However, the limitation of the efficient breach theory is
that it presupposes that wealth maximization is the paramount consideration for
all parties involved in a contract. This article shows that this is not necessarily
the case with States.
Typically, host States cite socio-economic reasons for their termination, rather
than profit maximization. This can be contrasted with commercial actors whose
only concern is making money. Thus, while the International Investment Law
certainly encourages efficiency, it does not provide host States with sufficient
flexibility to pursue its legitimate public objectives, when it breaches
agreements.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Under international law, host States have an obligation to compensate
an investor when the former prematurely terminates a concession
agreement with the latter.1 However, the basis upon which compensation is
to be assessed remains controversial.2 This is further compounded by the
fact that there is no clear position as to which standard of compensation is
applicable under international investment law.3 There are two standards of
compensation under international law. These are: appropriate compensation
and the ‘Hull Principle.’4
The appropriate compensation standard espouses that any
compensation payable to the investor should be determined on a case-bycase basis, taking into account all the relevant circumstances.5 This can be
contrasted with the Hull Principle, which espouses that compensation must
be prompt, adequate, and effective.6 The term adequate entails that the host
State must restore the investor to the position that he or she would have
been in had the termination not taken place. As such, the compensation
package must not only include sunk costs (damnum emergens) but also lost
future profits (lucrum cessans). Lost future profits are typically calculated
through the application of the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. This
involves deducting future expenditures from the gross receipts of the
enterprise. Issues of inflation are also taken into account.7
The DCF method is also applied by arbitral tribunals, who explicitly
adopt the appropriate compensation standard.8 This is advantageous
because it restores the investor to a position that he or she would have been
1

See IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 32 (2d ed. 2017); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE
LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 314-15 (2013).
2
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 514 (6th ed. 2003).
3
SURYA SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND
PRINCIPLE 124 (4th ed. 2020) (“For instance, there is a requirement in international law to
pay compensation against expropriation. However, international law does not spell out every
detail as to the method of arriving at an amount to be paid and how and when it is to be paid.
Even the ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation formula is not universally
accepted.”).
4
SANGWANI PATRICK NG’AMBI & KANGWA-MUSOLE GEORGE CHISANGA,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND GENDER EQUALITY: STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 79 (2020).
5
Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign
Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 179, 188-89 (1978).
6
See Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS AFFA, 6 Iran –U.S. C.T.R. 219,
225 (1984). See also JUNJI NAKAGAWA, NATIONALIZATION, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP AS A DYNAMIC
BARGAINING PROCESS 128 (2018).
7
Seymour J. Rubin, Guideline IV(6), World Bank Guidelines, on the Treatment of
Foreign Direct Investment, 31 I.L.M. 1363, 1383 (1992) [hereinafter Guidelines].
8
See Aminoil v. Kuwait, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1033, para. 144 (1982).
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in had the unilateral termination of the concession agreement not taken
place.9 Furthermore, the State only has an incentive to terminate a
concession in the event that it stands to make a profit, even after
indemnifying the foreign investor. In this sense, the rules pertaining to
compensation under international investment law promote efficiency
because no party loses out and one party, the State, makes a gain.
The rules pertaining to international investment law, as they do under
national law, certainly promote efficiency by giving the parties under the
contract an incentive to perform unless doing so would be inefficient.10 This
is the very essence of the efficient breach theory in contract law. One of the
pillars of this theory is that the main goals of the parties to a contract are to
make a profit and maximize wealth. As such, the interests and objectives of
the parties can fully be translated into monetary terms.
Despite the fact that the rules under international investment law
promote efficiency, there is a limitation to the application of the efficient
breach theory to concession agreements. This is owing to the fact that one
of the parties to the concession is the State, whose goals cannot solely be
quantified in monetary terms. When a State nationalizes or expropriates, for
example, this is invariably for a public purpose.11 This public purpose
would entail the reorganization of the State’s socio-economic policies.
Therefore, wealth maximization is not the paramount concern for the State.
This article argues that although the existing standards of compensation
promote efficiency, they do not provide sufficient flexibility for
governments whose objectives are often at variance with those of the
foreign investor.
Part Two of this article will examine the compensation standards
under international investment law. Part Three will examine the efficient
breach theory and its application under international investment law. Part
Four will consist of a conclusion.
2.0 STANDARDS OF COMPENSATION IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
When the host State nationalizes property belonging to a foreign
investor, it has a duty to pay compensation.12 As was stated by the arbitral
9

See Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 6 (Aug. 25) (the “Chorzow factory case”) [hereinafter German Interests].
10 Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. L.R.
1679, 1680 (2008). See also ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2013).
11 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 564 (2d ed. 2008).
12 See Muna Ndulo, The Nationalization of the Zambian Copper Industry, 6 ZAM. L.J.
55, 65 (1974); Paolo Vargiu, Environmental Expropriation in International Investment Law,
in FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND COMMON CONCERNS: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
213 (Tullio Treves, Francesco Seatzu, & Seline Trevisanut eds., 2014); David Khachvani,
Unlawful Expropriation: Targeting the Illegality, 32 ICSID REV. 385 (2017).
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tribunal in the Upton Case,13 States have the unquestionable right to
“appropriate private property for public purpose.”14 However, there is a
duty to compensate the owner.15 The classical purpose behind
compensation is to eliminate all the consequences of the State’s action. This
means restoring the investor to a position that he or she would have been in
had the State not unilaterally abrogated the agreement.16
There are two standards of compensation under international
investment law. The first is the ‘Hull Principle,’ which requires that
compensation payable must be ‘prompt, adequate and effective.’ Of
importance is the term ‘adequate.’ The adequacy of compensation is
contingent upon compensating the investor for the full market value of the
nationalized assets and also for lost future profits (lucrum cessans).17 The
other standard only requires the host State pay ‘appropriate compensation.’
This is determined on a case-by-case basis. The first part of this section will
examine the Hull Principle. The second part will discuss the appropriate
compensation standard before discussing lost future profits in the third part.
2.1 The Hull Principle
The Hull Principle is very specific in that it espouses a formula for
compensation. Under this principle, compensation must be “prompt,
adequate and effective.”18 According to this principle, the term “adequate”
means that the nationalizing State should restore the investor to the same
position that the latter would have been in, had the nationalization not
occurred. Thus, the compensation package must include the market value of
the enterprise and lost future profits.19 The term ‘prompt’ means that the
payment must be made within a ‘reasonable time’20 and there should be no
inordinate delays.21 Furthermore, the interest rate payable should be such
that it does not have an adverse effect on the adequacy of the
compensation.22 ‘Effective’ means that the currency should be made in a
freely convertible currency. Moreover, there should be no restriction on its

13

Upton Case, Ven. Arb., 172 (1903).
Id. at 173.
15 Id.
16 Aréchaga, supra note 5, at 180.
17 See AGIP Company v. Popular Republic of the Congo, 21 I.L.M. 726 (1982); Richard
J. Smith, The United States Government Perspective on Expropriation and Investment in
Developing Countries, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 517, 519 (1976).
18 GREEN HACKWORTH, 3 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 660-65 (1942).
19 Smith, supra note 17, at 519.
20 RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §712 cmt. g
(AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 1982).
21 Pamela B. Gann, Compensation Standard for Expropriation, 23 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 615, 620 (1985).
22 Id.
14
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repatriation.23
In later years, the State Department of the United States developed
further guidelines on the term ‘adequate.’24 In its view, when American
owned property is expropriated, the owner must be paid full market value
for its assets. Fair market value is to be calculated as if the expropriation
had not occurred. The State Department acknowledged that market value is
not always ascertainable because there might have been no recent sales of
comparable property.25 Given this fact, the State Department utilizes three
indirect valuation methods in order to determine market value.26 These are
the going concern approach, the replacement cost approach, and the book
value approach.27
Under the ‘going concern’ approach, estimations of market value are
based on the earning power of the company.28 This includes considering the
loss of future profits, which are typically based on past earnings or
estimates of future earnings. The State Department recognized that it will
not always be possible to apply this method because doing so might be
impractical or unfair, especially in instances where the investment has not
been operating long and therefore has a limited profit history.29 The State
Department also recognized that this method is susceptible to government
manipulations, that may distort the profitability of the operations.30 This
includes, “increased taxes, threat of cancellation of contractual or
concessionary rights, or withdrawals of privileges.”31
Some tribunals have been rather cautious about awarding lost future
profits because they can be speculative. This was certainly the position
taken in the separate opinion of Professor Brownlie in the case of CME v.
Czech Republic.32 He contended that compensation must be both just and
reflect the genuine value of the investments affected.33 The genuine value
of the investment must be compatible with a reasonable rate of return. 34
Thus, in his separate opinion, Professor Brownlie awarded a sum of $160.9
million. By his own admission, this was significantly lower than that
23

RESTATEMENT

OF THE

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

OF THE

UNITED STATES, supra note

20.
24

Smith, supra note 17, at 519-520.
Id. at 520.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.; see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES
ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 226 (2002).
29 Smith, supra note 17, at 520.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 519.
32 CME Czech Republic B.V. (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, 69, (UNCITRAL Arb.
Trib. Mar. 14, 2003).
33 Id. at 106.
34 Id. at 115.
25
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rendered in the Final Award. 35 This is evidence that even in a tribunal there
can be disagreement as to how to quantify loss to the investor.
Under the ‘replacement cost’ approach, the party determining the
amount of compensation payable should look at the cost of replacing the
property at the time of the expropriation “less actual depreciation.”36
Although this amount is greater than book value, it does not take into
account the earning power of the entity, which is determined through
looking at projected future profits. The State Department considered this
approach “generally less acceptable in most circumstances than the goingconcern approach.”37 It is further noted that this method is rarely applicable
in instances of government takings and can only be used where replacement
costs are identical to taken assets. This is rarely the case when assets are
taken by the State. Moreover, because the investor’s assets are typically
very unique, estimating the value of replacement is impossible.38
The ‘book value’ approach involves valuing assets at the “acquisition
cost less depreciation . . . .”39 The State Department says that the value
under this approach “bears little relationship to [the] actual value.”40 This
was illustrated in the case of Asian Agricultural Ltd v. Republic of Sri
Lanka.41 In this case, the State had a duty to provide full protection and
security to the investment in question. Due to the State’s failure to do so,
armed insurgents destroyed a shrimp farm, in which the investor had a 48
per cent shareholding interest. The Tribunal refused to order the State to
pay for lost profits in this case. This is because the purchaser would have
been rather sceptical about whether future earnings could sufficiently offset
past losses. Furthermore, the loans the company had taken out exceeded the
company’s assets. 42
Since the investor could not be compensated for any future profits, the
arbitral tribunal drew up a comprehensive balance sheet.43 This
comprehensive balance sheet was a reflection of the investor’s assets and
liabilities, which was derived from a list of the company’s tangible assets.44
The book value approach disregards various factors such as the
“enterprises’ contractual rights, know-how, goodwill, and management
skills.”45 It also merely measures what is on the company’s balance sheet.
35

Id. at 121. The tribunal itself rendered an award of US $270 million. Id. at ¶ 649.
Smith, supra note 17, at 519.
37 Id.
38 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 319 (1st ed. 2007).
39 Smith, supra note 17, at 520.
40 Id.
41 ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3 (1990), 30 I.L.M. 577 (1991).
42 Id. at ¶ 103.
43 Id. at ¶ 98.
44 Id.
45 MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER supra note 38, at 319.
36
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This is usually determined by applying standard accounting principles.46
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the State Department considers this
the least acceptable method of valuation.47
In determining the applicable method of valuation, all the
circumstances of the case must be considered. In this way, the individual
determining compensation payable may apply one method or a combination
of them in arriving at a figure that will justly compensate the investor. The
State Department further recognizes that compensation can also come in
non-monetary forms, including as goods, kickbacks, and other services.48
2.2 Appropriate Compensation
Under the appropriate compensation standard, the amount payable to
the investor should be determined on a case by case basis.49 In sharp
contrast to the Hull Principle, the appropriate compensation standard
requires no precise definition.50 Not having a precise definition is beneficial
because it provides a flexible standard which can accommodate all the
prevailing circumstances when determining the amount of compensation
payable to the investor.51 The appropriate compensation standard has been
endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly, the European Court of
Human Rights, the House of Lords and the United States Court of Appeals
(Second Circuit).52
The appropriate compensation standard was endorsed by the United
Nations General Assembly in Resolution 1803 (1962). This General
Assembly Resolution is particularly notable, because it was endorsed by
both developed and developing nations, although in this instance the United
States believed the term ‘appropriate’ meant ‘prompt, adequate, and
effective’ to be in line with the Hull Formula.53 General Assembly
Resolution 1803 states that:
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on
grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest
46

Id. at 321. See also Paul D. Friedland & Eleanor Wong, Measuring Damages for the
Deprivation of Income-Producing Assets: ICSID Case Studies, 6 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV.
L. J. 400, 404-05 (1991).
47 Smith, supra note 17, at 519.
48 Id. at 520.
49 Ebrahimi v. Iran 30 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 174, ¶¶ 88, 95 (1994); see also Aréchaga,
supra note 5, at 185.
50 Rudolf Dolzer, Expropriation and Nationalization, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 214, 218-19 (1985); Andra Eisenberg, Different Constitutional
Formulations of Compensation Clauses, 9 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 412, 418 (1993).
51 M Sornarajah, Compensation for Expropriation. The Emergence of New Standards,
13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 108, 127-28 (1979).
52 See Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 416-20.
53 See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Story of the U.N.’s Declaration on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A. J. 463, 465 (1963).
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which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private
interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases, the owner shall
be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in
force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its
sovereignty and in accordance with international law.54

The General Assembly took a similar position in the Charter on the
Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS).55 It recognized the right of
States to nationalize foreign property, provided that appropriate
compensation is paid by the host State “taking into account its relevant laws
and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent.”56 It
further states that in the event where the issue of compensation leads to
controversy, the matter must be settled under the national laws and tribunals
of the host State unless it is otherwise agreed.57
In Lithgow v. United Kingdom,58 the European Court of Human Rights
held that the right to nationalize was linked to the right of a State to
determine the amount of compensation payable to the individual. The State
is in the best place to make such a determination because it has a wider
knowledge “of their society and its needs and resources . . . .”59 Given this
fact, the State is better placed to determine what measures it ought to take.
The European Court of Human Rights could not divorce the United
Kingdom’s determination of compensation from its actual decision to
nationalize “since the factors influencing the latter will of necessity also
influence the former.”60 For this reason, the European Court of Human
Rights refused to question the legislature’s judgment, unless there were
reasonable grounds to do so. 61
In the case of Williams & Humbert Ltd. v. W. & H. Trademarks, the
House of Lords considered the question of compensation when the Spanish
government nationalized property belonging to an English family. 62 The
House of Lords endorsed the appropriate compensation standard. Lord
Templeman opined that it was a firmly established principle that the host
State has the right to nationalize property. Compensation had to be
determined in light of the State’s right to nationalize.63
The American case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan
54 General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962; see also General Assembly
Resolution 2158 (XXI) of 1966.
55 General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 1974.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 329 (1986).
59 Id. at 373.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 [1986] 1 AC 368 (Eng.).
63 Id. at ¶¶ 430-441.
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Bank64 arose out of the Cuban nationalizations. The United States Court of
Appeals (Second Circuit), in this case, held that failure to pay compensation
after nationalizing private assets is a violation of international law.65 The
Court of Appeals (Second Circuit) contended that the standard applicable
would have been appropriate compensation. However, the court also held
that ‘appropriate’ could also mean ‘full compensation.’ The Court of
Appeal thus contended that:
It may well be the consensus of nations that full compensation need
not be paid “in all circumstances,” . . . and that requiring an
expropriating state to pay “appropriate compensation,” even
considering the lack of precise definition of that term, would come
closest to reflecting what international law requires. But the adoption
of an “appropriate compensation” requirement would not exclude
the possibility that in some cases full compensation would be
appropriate.66

The World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct
Investment echo the sentiments espoused in the Banco Nacional case and
endorse the ‘appropriate compensation’ standard. However, they also state
that compensation is only appropriate if it is ‘adequate, effective and
prompt.’67
It is clear from the foregoing that no consensus exists on which
standard of compensation applies in international investment law.68 It
would appear that the Hull Principle is not universally accepted.69 However,
it has been adopted in most, although not all, Bilateral Investment
Treaties.70 Although arbitral tribunals do not explicitly endorse the Hull
Principle, they do recognize its foundational principles. This is reflected in
the fact that arbitral tribunals invariably recognize that lost future profits
should be included in the award of compensation. As such, even though
appropriate compensation might be the standard applied, the effect of
arbitral decisions reflects a standard of compensation that resembles the
64

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id.
66 Id. at 892.
67 See also Guideline IV(1) & IV(2), Guidelines, supra note 7, at 1382.
68 Rudolph Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75
AM. J. INT’L L. 553, 553 (1981).
69 See Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT’L L., 121
(1984); Frank G. Dawson & Burns H. Weston, Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal
Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 727 (1962).
70 Lowenfeld, supra note 11, at 564; MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER supra note 38, at
317; Wenhua Shan, Is Calvo Dead?, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 123 (2007). See also Wenhua Shan
& Norah Gallagher, China, in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES
131, 164-65 (Chester Brown ed., 2013) (discussing the Chinese Model BIT. Even though it
avoids language such as ‘adequate’ as per the Hull Formula, the actual calculation methods
prescribed are not substantially different the aforementioned standard of compensation.).
65
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Hull Principle.71
2.3 Lost Future Profits
The case law examined in this section demonstrates that the State is
under an obligation to compensate the investor for lost future profits in the
event that it prematurely terminates a concession. Loss of future profits
have oftentimes been part of the criteria used in determining the fair market
value of the property when it was taken.72 Some writers argue that loss of
future profits should only be included in the compensation package when
the taking is deemed to be illegal.73 However, this subsection demonstrates
that lost future profits are awarded even where the taking is deemed to be
legal.74 Thus, arbitral tribunals make no distinction between legal and
illegal takings. This is because the rationale behind paying compensation is
to restore the investor to the same pecuniary position they would have been
in had the nationalization not taken place.75 As observed by the tribunal in
Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co.
(NIOC):76
This rule is simply a direct deduction from the principle pacta sunt
servanda, since its only effect is to substitute a pecuniary obligation
for the obligation which was promised but not performed. It is
therefore natural that the creditor should thereby be given full
compensation. This compensation includes loss suffered (damnum
emergens), for example expenses incurred in performing the
contract, and the profit lost (lucrum cessans), for example the net
profit which the contract would have produced. The award of
compensation for the lost profit or the loss of a possible benefit has
been frequently allowed by international tribunals.77

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the State has two obligations:
to either perform its obligations under the contract or to compensate the
71 M.H. Mendelson, Compensation for Expropriation: The Case Law, 79 AM. J. INT’L L.
414, 415 (1985).
72 Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
79, 123 (1989).
73 Derek W. Bowett, State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on
Compensation for Termination or Breach, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 49, 63 (1988). See also IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 539 (7th ed. 2008); Irmgard
Marboe, Compensation and Damages in International Law—The Limits of Fair Market
Value, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 723 (2006).
74 See CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 226; William C. Lieblich, Determinations by
International Tribunals of the Economic Value of Expropriated Enterprises, 7 J. INT’L ARB.
37, 47-48 (1990).
75 Sapphire Int’l Petroleum Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC), 35 I.L.R. 136, 185-86
(1963).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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investor. This package includes loss suffered and lost future net profits. An
early case in which lost future profits were awarded is the Case Concerning
German Interests in Upper Silesia.78 In this case, the Permanent Court of
International Justice awarded lost future profits because the host State had
unilaterally abrogated its treaty obligations. In this case, the Polish
government had taken over a company in which German companies had
rights. This was specifically prohibited by Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention Concerning Upper Silesia. Article 6 thus provided that the
whilst the Polish government had a general right to nationalize, the right did
not extend to property belonging to German nationals.79 The German
government thus sued Poland for compensation.
The Permanent Court of International Justice held that in the event
where a government breaches an undertaking, there is general obligation to
make reparations. 80 In their view, such reparations, “must, as far as
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed.”81 They contended that this included the award of lost
future profits.82
The International Court of Arbitration took a similar approach in the
case of Lena Goldfield v. USSR.83 In assessing damages, the arbitral
tribunal contended that the Soviet Union had unjustly enriched itself,
through the repudiation of their agreement.84 Thus, Lena Goldfields was
awarded a sum of £13 million. Implicitly included within this figure was
lost future profits because Lena Goldfields had only invested an initial sum
of $20 million.85
Lost future profits are determined by determining future gross earnings
of a company and deducting future liabilities. This is called the discounted
cash flow (DCF) method. This approach was certainly taken by the arbitral
tribunal in the case of LIAMCO v. Libya.86 The arbitral tribunal did
acknowledge that Libya had the sovereign right to prematurely terminate its
agreement with LIAMCO. Although the premature termination was deemed
legal, it did constitute a ‘source of liability to compensate the

78

German Interests, supra note 9.
Id. at 21.
80 Id. at 29.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 52.
83 Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet
Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31, 42 (1950-51).
84 Id.
85 Jason W. Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors
Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1575
(2009).
86 20 I.L.M. 1-87, 81 (1981).
79
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concessionaire.’87 This includes lost future profits.88 The arbitrator stated:
In such confused state of international law, . . . it appears clearly that
there is no conclusive evidence of the existence of community or
uniformity in principles between the domestic law of Libya and
international law concerning the determination of compensation for
nationalization in lieu of specific performance, and in particular
concerning the problem whether or not all or part of the loss of
profits (lucrum cessans) should be included in that compensation in
addition to the damage incurred (damnum emergens).89

The arbitral tribunal thus recognized that loss of future profits ought to
be paid to LIAMCO. However, it deemed the naturalization legal. In
determining the value of compensation due to it, LIAMCO hired an
independent expert to make an evaluation. The expert estimated the amount
of crude oil, liquids, and gas that would have been produced for the
remainder of the contract. LIAMCO used the official market price of July
1976 to estimate the gross revenues that it would have made until the
contract elapsed in 1988. It did not upwardly adjust this amount to take into
account any future increases in market prices. LIAMCO then deducted
operating costs and any taxes and royalties that it would have had to pay
from this gross figure. The tax and royalty rates were based on those that
existed prior to the nationalization measures taken in 1973. It applied a 12%
discount factor to the net figure and the valuation came to $186,270,000.90
The arbitral tribunal reduced this figure to $66,000,000, as ‘equitable
compensation,’ reasoning that it did not take into account the currency
inflation which was virtually certain to occur. 91
The DCF method was also applied in the case of Aminoil v. Kuwait.92
Although the arbitral tribunal deemed the nationalization to be legal, it did
include lost future profits when it determined the compensation award.
However, the arbitral tribunal examined all the circumstances of the case
and opined that its award had to be consistent with the legitimate
expectations of the parties concerned.93 The tribunal further noted that
“with reference to every long-term contract . . . there must necessarily be
economic calculations, and the weighing-up of rights and obligations, of
chances and risks, constituting the contractual equilibrium.”94
In the tribunal’s view, AMINOIL’s expectations were reflected in the
1973 agreement between the parties. It had been subsequently modified by
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 60.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 76.
Gann, supra note 21, at 631.
See German Interests, supra note 9, at 160.
21 ILM 976 (1982).
Id. at ¶ 148.
Id.
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the Abu Dhabi Formula, which led to the increase of tax and royalty rates
payable to the government of Kuwait.95 Given that AMINOIL had already
agreed to this formula, any calculation of future lost profits would have to
give due consideration to it. Therefore, the amount awarded to AMINOIL
was based on a reasonable rate of return and not on the one presented,
which was excessive given the lower taxes and royalty rates reflected in the
earlier concession agreement.96
The International Centre of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunals
have also included lost future profits in their awards. The first case that
illustrates this is that of AGIP v. Popular Republic of Congo.97 The
claimant’s interest in a Congolese company was nationalized by the
government of Congo. The arbitral tribunal applied the law of Congo,
which incorporated elements of the French Civil Code.98 The
aforementioned Code permitted recovery of lost future profits.99 As such,
the ICSID tribunal awarded lost future profits to AGIP.100
Thus, the ICSID Tribunal recognizes that lost future profits must be
included in compensatory judgments. However, it is reluctant to award lost
future profits in instances where they are indeterminable. Lost future profits
are indeterminable in instances where the nationalized entity does not have
a sufficient profit-making history. In these cases, any proposed figure
would be purely speculative. For this reason, arbitral tribunals are reluctant
to award lost future profits in these instances. This is illustrated in the case
of Benevuti et Bonfant v. People’s Republic of Congo.101
In this case, the government of Congo had nationalized a company in
which Benevuti et Bonfant (B & B), an Italian corporation, had a 40%
equity interest.102 B & B had entered into an agreement with the Congolese
government, under which they were to build a bottle manufacturing plant in
the host State.103 Plant production commenced in 1975. However, the
owners of the corporation left Congo the following year, upon advice by the
Italian Embassy, that their safety was in jeopardy.104 Subsequently, the
Congolese army occupied the plant. Although there was no formal act of
expropriation, B & B contended that the actions of the Congolese
government comprised a takeover of its interest in the operation.
The tribunal contended that it had the jurisdiction to decide the dispute
ex aequo et bono (in justice and fairness), in accordance with Article 42(3)
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
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of the ICSID Convention.105 B & B contended that the value of its 40%
ownership interest was CFA 110,098,936. In calculating this figure, it
accounted for projections of expected profits over the period of the
agreement.106
The arbitral tribunal appointed an independent expert to make the
valuation. The expert advised that future profits could not be included in the
award because, during its one year of operation, the company had not
realized any profits. Therefore, given that its profit-making history was
non-existent, the expert treated the expropriated entity as a start-up, rather
than a full-fledged business. The expert then made an evaluation based on
the most objective criteria at this time. This involved examining the amount
of the original investment and multiplying this by B & B’s 40% interest.
The expert’s valuation totalled CFA 122,000,000,107 a figure that exceeded
the amount originally claimed by B & B.
Although the tribunal agreed with the expert opinion, it lowered B &
B’s award to CFA 110,098,936, the original figure it had claimed. The
tribunal justified the reduction by reasoning that the claimant could not
receive compensation greater than the damages claimed.108 However, the
tribunal did add interest to the award, which was applied from the date of
the Congolese government’s takeover of the B & B facility. B & B
requested an interest rate of 15% but the arbitral tribunal awarded 10%, the
rate the Congolese government used in their counterclaims. Invoking its
authority to decide the matter ex aequo et bono, the tribunal opined that a
rate of 10% was equitable under the circumstances.109 This comports with
the State Department’s position on lost future profits. It acknowledges that
under the general rule, lost future profits should be included in the
compensation package, although this may not be practical if the amount of
such profits is indeterminable.110
This position can be contrasted with the latter case of SOABI v.
Senegal.111 SOABI was a company controlled largely by Belgian interests.
The project here involved the implementation of a project for the
construction of low-income housing in Dakar, Senegal.112 SOABI was also
to construct a factory for the prefabrication of reinforced concrete.113 The
government of Senegal unilaterally terminated the underlying contract. As
105

Id. at ¶¶ 4.4, 4.65.
Id. at ¶ 4.75.
107 Id. at ¶ 4.78.
108 Id. at ¶ 4.79.
109 Id. at ¶ 4.98.
110 Smith, supra note 17 at 519; Gann, supra note 21, at 625.
111 Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels v. State of Senegal, ICSID Case No.
ARB/82/1, 2 ICSID Rep. 164 (1988).
112 Nassib G. Ziadé, Some Recent Decisions in ICSID Cases, 6 ICSID-REV. – FILJ, 515,
521 (1991).
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such, SOABI initiated arbitral proceedings against Senegal. The ICSID
Tribunal held that Senegal was liable for the unilateral termination of the
underlying contract and should therefore compensate SOABI. This included
resulting damages (damnum emergens) and lost future profits (lucrum
cessans), despite the fact that SOABI had not yet made any profits. This is
consistent with earlier non-ICSID cases such as Delagoa Bay and East
African Railway114 and Sapphire International.115
In the Delagao case, the Portuguese government annulled a railroad
concession before operations could commence.116 Despite this, the tribunal
opined that lucrum cessans were payable. Similarly, the tribunal in
Sapphire International held that the claimant was entitled to lost future
profits, despite the fact that the area in dispute had not even been
prospected yet.117 Since the SOABI decision, subsequent ICSID tribunals
have been reluctant to award lost profits in instances where the claimant
does not demonstrate a track record of profitability.118 In this sense, the
position in SOABI is more the exception than the norm.119
This section has shown that the State has a duty to pay compensation
to the investor when it unilaterally terminates an agreement. Although there
are currently two prevailing standards of compensation under international
investment law, the case law shows that lost future profits are often
included in the compensation package, even where the tribunal has elected
appropriate compensation as the applicable standard. The only exception to
this, is where such lost future profits are indeterminable. Moreover,
international investment law makes no distinction between lawful and
unlawful takings when awarding lost profits. Due regard must be given to
future revenues the investor would have generated. Not doing so would be
to “confiscate a portion of his or her property without compensation.”120
3.0 THE EFFICIENT BREACH THEORY UNDER INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
According to the efficient breach theory, “a party should be allowed to
breach a contract and pay damages, if doing so would be more

114 United States and Great Britain v. Portugal (1900) quoted in Majorie M. Whiteman,
Damages in International Law: Volume 3 1694, 1697 (United States Government Printing
Office, 1943).
115 Sapphire Int’l Petroleum Ltd., supra note 75 at. 187-88.
116 Whiteman, supra note 114, at 1697.
117 Sapphire Int’l Petroleum Ltd., supra note 75, at 190.
118 See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No, ARB (AF)/00/2 (2004); see also Wena Hotels Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/98/4, 6 ICSID Rep. 67 (2000); Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v.
Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of Ghana, 95 ILR 183 (1990).
119 See MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 38, at 325.
120 See Lieblich, supra note 74, at 47-48.
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economically efficient than performing under the contract.”121 This theory
espouses the view that contract law aims to promote efficient behavior.
Parties entering into a mutually beneficial agreement are making each other
better off.122 Such mutually beneficial contracts promote ‘welfare’123 or
‘wealth maximisation.’124 The efficient breach theory operates under the
auspices of ‘utilitarianism.’125 This ideology propounds the view that the
law exists to promote the greatest good for the greatest number.126 Although
a plethora of utilitarian justifications exist within contract law, the efficient
breach theory remains the most prominent of them.127
The term ‘efficiency’ is seen through the prism of two schools of
thought: Pareto efficiency on the one hand, and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency on
the other.128 Pareto efficiency is divided into two categories: Pareto
optimality and Pareto superiority. Pareto optimality considers behavior
efficient if one party’s welfare is enhanced at the expense of another.129
Rules modelled after Pareto superiority, on the other hand, leave no person
worse off and grant benefits to at least one person.130
Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a rule is efficient if the benefits parties
receive from the rule outweigh the losses incurred by those that might be
harmed by it. As such, a transaction is efficient even if it produces winners
and losers. Simply, the winners must gain more than the losers lose.131
Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, compensation is not paid to the losers. The
criterion is satisfied, “as long as the monetised value of the health gains for
the winners is greater than the monetized loss of health for the losers.” 132 If
the transaction was without cost and full compensation is given to the
losers, then the transaction is deemed to be Pareto superior, rather than
Black’s Law Dictionary 592 (9th ed. 2009).
See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 961,
964 (2012).
123 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-61 (1981).
124 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 96
(2001); see also Gregory Klass, The Rules of the Game and Morality of Efficient Breach, 29
Y. J. L. & HUMAN. 71 (2017).
125 PETER HALSTEAD, JURISPRUDENCE 72 (2005).
126 See THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: A COMMENT ON THE
COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 393 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.,
1977).
127 See generally STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 136-40 (2004) [hereinafter
SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY].
128 Richard S. Markovits, Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of
the Concept of the Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 485, 489 (1993).
129 Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
509, 512-13 (1980).
130 Id. at 513.
131 See POSNER AND SYKES, supra, note 10 at 13.
132 Id.
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Kaldor-Hicks efficient. For this reason, it is advanced that Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency is a ‘potential Pareto-Superior’ standard.133 However, the
difficulty with this proposition lies in the failure to compensate the loser in
such a scenario. Consequently, individuals are left worse off, falling short
of the conditions prescribed under Pareto superiority.134
The position espoused under Pareto superiority is more widely utilized
as the standard in determining efficient behaviour under the efficient breach
theory.135 This is primarily because self-interested persons do not object to
its use. Coleman advances that people would object to policies which would
make at least one person better off, without anyone else suffering in the
process.136 Moreover, it has been observed that:
Exchanges among knowledgeable, rational persons in a free market
are generally Pareto superior; rational individuals do not strike
bargains with one another unless each perceives it to be in his or her
own interest to do so. A successful exchange between such parties is,
therefore, one in which the value to each of what he or she
relinquishes is perceived as less than the value of what each receives
in return. Such exchanges make no individual worse off; often they
improve the lot of all concerned. Pareto superiority is connected in
this way to the ideal of a free-exchange market.137

On the other hand, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency requires a more complex
evaluation of personal comparisons of welfare. Pareto efficiency simply
asks whether everyone did or would agree to a decision.138
When it comes to remedies under contract law, the implications of the
two theories of efficiency are very important. Contract law promotes
efficiency through damages. This is underscored by the dominance of
damages over specific performance in contract cases.139 As such, if the
promisor breaches an agreement, then he or she has an obligation to
compensate the promisee for that breach. 140 Courts prefer damages over
specific performance because in some instances, it might not be
economically efficient to induce the promisor to complete specific

133

GUIDO CALABRESI AND PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 85-86 (1978).
See Coleman, supra note 129, at 513
135 Id. at 520.
136 Id. at 516.
137 Id. at 516-17.
138 SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 127, at 110-11.
139 See EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL: THE LAW OF CONTRACT 988, 1099 (13th ed. Sweet &
Maxwell 2011).
140 ROBERT UPEX AND GEOFFREY BENNETT, DAVIES ON CONTRACT 288-89 (10th ed.
Sweet & Maxwell 2008); see also OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 300-01
(Macmillan 1882); see also Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897).
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performance of a contract.141 This is illustrated in the following scenario:
Suppose I sign a contract to deliver 100,000 custom-ground widgets
at 10¢ apiece to A for use in his boiler factory. After I have delivered
10,000, B comes to me, explains that he desperately needs 25,000
custom-ground widgets at once since otherwise he will be forced to
close his pianola factory at great cost, and offers me 15¢ apiece for
them. I sell him the widgets and as a result do not complete timely
delivery to A, causing him to lose $1,000 in profits. Having obtained
an additional profit of $1,250 on the sale to B, I am better off even
after reimbursing A for his loss, and B is also better off. The breach
is therefore Pareto superior. True had I refused to sell to B he could
have gone to A and negotiated an assignment to him of part of A’s
contract to me. But this would have introduced an additional step,
with additional transaction costs – and high ones, because it would
be a bilateral monopoly negotiation. 142

In such a scenario, efficiency would encourage the parties to repudiate
their obligations “where the promisor is able to profit from his default after
placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had
performance been rendered.”143 Thus, the object of contract law aims to
incentivize the promisor to fulfil his or her contractual obligations “unless
the result would be an inefficient use of resources.”144
In addition, the efficient breach theory does not constitute a
‘prescriptive recommendation to act wrongfully’ as claimed by some
detractors.145 Nor does it immorally enrich a party that breaches a contract
as charged by others.146 An act is only immoral if it is undertaken without
consideration for the well-being and interests of other people.147 The wellbeing of a disappointed promisee is sufficiently addressed under the
efficient breach theory. The efficient breach theory ensures that
disappointed promisees are paid damages. Damages are calculated so as to
include future profits anticipated from a particular transaction.148 The
141

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

OF

LAW 150 (8th ed., Wolters Kluwer

2011).
142

Id. at 151
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inclusion of lost future profits in a compensation package of this sort
effectively places the disappointed promisee in the position that he or she
would have occupied had the breach not taken place. Once the promisee is
restored to this position, whether or not the contract is completed ceases to
be of consequence. In other words, the promisee is rendered indifferent as
to whether the promisor completes the contract or not. The fact that lost
future profits are included in the compensation package, means that the
promisor is deterred from breaching the contract unless they can both: (1)
compensate the investor; and (2) still make a profit over and above the
amount they have compensated.149
Compensation is also the dominant remedy under international
investment law, just as it is under domestic contract law of most common
law countries. Although there are a number of advantages to specific
performance,150 compensation is a more practical option under international
investment law. Specific performance is difficult to enforce. This was
certainly illustrated in the case of LIAMCO v. Libya. There, the tribunal
rejected LIAMCO’s claims for specific performance, because such a
remedy would be impossible to implement.151 This is owing to “prevalent
international practice” and the fact that it was “practically incapable of
compulsory execution[.]”152 Furthermore, ordering specific performance
militates against the State’s right to nationalize a private entity. The tribunal
decided that the nationalization was lawful, provided it was nondiscriminatory and not accompanied by a wrongful act. Therefore, the
arbitral tribunal in LIAMCO v. Libya, refused to reverse the nationalization
and accordingly rejected specific performance as a remedy.153
On a broader level, international investment law promotes efficiency
by addressing the risks proceeding from long-term investment projects.154
The rules and devices that exist effectively prevent the host State from
taking advantage of the investor once the latter has sunk his or her
investment.155 Without these mechanisms, any undertakings made by the
149
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Friedman, supra note 146, at 7; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual
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Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 423 (2007).
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host State are subject to reversal once the investment has sunk and
operations have commenced. For example, the host State could tax the
investor heavily, or nationalize their business outright.156 Contractual
mechanisms protect against this, and are contained within agreements
between the host State and the investor. There are also protections found in
national law, international law and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).157
Furthermore, international arbitration provides a forum under which
aggrieved investors can bring action against a host State that has violated an
agreement. This allows the investor to bring an action in a private and
neutral forum rather than the national courts, which have the potential for
bias against the investor. Arbitration proceedings also benefit from
international conventions prescribing the mechanisms under which arbitral
awards are enforced.158
It is advanced that international investment law encourages parties to
comply with their obligations under a concession agreement, unless so
doing would be inefficient.159 This is evinced by the compensation regime
under international investment law. As shown in the preceding section, if a
State breaches a concession agreement then it has an obligation to
compensate the investor.
As is the case found under law found in the domestic, rather than
international forum, compensation under international investment law
requires restoring the investor to the position they would have been in had
the breach not taken place. This includes not only compensating them for
sunk costs, but also for lost future profits. If the State makes a profit, even
after compensating the investor, inclusive of lost future profits, then the
State has theoretically acted efficiently. This proceeds from the State
making a gain while the investor loses nothing, thus falling within the
parameters of Pareto efficiency. If the State cannot achieve that end, then
the compensation regime acts as a deterrent towards terminating the
concession agreement.
Marsh argues that, “an expropriation or nationalization spurned by an
obsolescing bargain will realize a net loss.”160 Such an action would result
in economic harm to the investor. Foreign investors may be reluctant to
invest in a State that does not meet its contractual obligations.
156 Id. at 288. See also Edith Penrose, George Joffé, & Paul Stevens, Nationalization of
Foreign-Owned Property for a Public Purpose: An Economic Perspective on Appropriate
Compensation, 55 MOD. L. REV. 351, 354-55 (1992).
157 See generally SALACUSE, supra note 1.
158 POSNER & SYKES, supra note 10, at 295.
159 Louis T. Wells, Double Dipping in the Arbitration Awards? An Economist Questions
Damages Awarded to Karaha Boadas Company in Indonesia, 19 ARB. INT’L 471, 478
(2003).
160 Brandon Marsh, Preventing the Inevitable: The Benefits of Contractual Risk
Engineering in the Light of Venezuela’s Recent Oil Field Nationalization, 13 STAN. J. L.
BUS. & FIN. 453, 457-58 (2008).
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Consequently, the host State loses in the long-term, even if they realize a
short-term benefit. This is further compounded by the fact that nationalized
entities tend not to be as profitable as privatized ones.161 This is because of
reduced levels of present and future investment.162 This, coupled with
outright mismanagement, means that nationalized entities produce less,
which in turn has an adverse effect on the economy.163
The first part of this argument, that state expropriation or forced
nationalization harms investors, fails. The host State will have to pay the
investor lost future profits. The investor thus loses nothing because they are
restored to the position they would have been in had the contractual breach
not taken place. Even if the compensation regime was non-existent, the
investor still has access to insurance facilities such as the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which cover various political
risks.164 Moreover, investors still go on to invest their capital in countries
with a history of unilaterally terminating concession agreements.165
The latter half of the argument above, that the State loses in the long
term when breaching foreign investment contracts, touches upon a very
pertinent point: that economic efficiency is not as central to the objectives
of the State as it is to foreign investors. Foreign investors are private entities
and typically seek profit above other priorities. However, States do not seek
to maximize wealth because their priorities are socio-economic.166 The
assumption of the efficient breach theory, is that all parties to the contract
are seeking to maximize wealth. Wealth maximization is defined strictly in
monetary terms.167 Wealth maximization is seen as a factor determining
whether a certain state of affairs is efficient or not.168
A State will certainly weigh its options before it violates an
agreement.169 However, wealth maximization is typically a peripheral
161 SANGWANI PATRICK NG’AMBI, RESOURCE NATIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 95 (2016).
162 Id.
163 Marsh, supra note 160.
164 See S. Linn Williams, Political and Other Risk Insurance: OPIC, MIGA, EXIMBANK
and Other Providers, 5 PACE INT’L L. REV. 59 (1993).
165 See generally Paul Stevens, National Oil Companies and International Oil
Companies in the Middle East: Under the Shadow of Government and the Resource
Nationalism Cycle, 1 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 5. (2008).
166 NG’AMBI, supra note 161, at 96.
167 See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 119 (1979) (stating that “wealth is the value in dollars or dollar equivalents (an
important qualification, as we are about to see) of everything in society. It is measured by
what people are willing to pay for something or, if they already own it, what they demand in
money to give it up. The only kind of preference that counts in a system of wealth
maximization is thus one that is backed up by money—in other words, that is registered in a
market.”).
168 Coleman, supra note 129, at 23, 526.
169 Richard Morrison, Efficient Breach of International Agreements, 23 DENVER J. OF
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consideration because nationalizations, or termination of a concession,
invariably take place when resource-rich nations wish to make changes to
their socioeconomic systems.170 The duty to pay full market value,
including lost future profits, instead of book value, effectively dissuades
host States from pursuing this legitimate purpose.171
When the Zambian government nationalized the country’s copper
mines in the 1970s, for example, it cited socio-economic reasons.172 The
government of Zambia cited the need to raise the standards of living of the
poor.173 In addition, the government was concerned that the mining
industry, which made up a sizeable portion of the Zambian economy, was
dominated by two foreign entities: Anglo-American Corporation and the
Roan Selection Trust.174 As such, the government’s main concern was that
Zambia’s socio-economic interests were subservient to the commercial
interests of the two aforementioned companies. In 2008, the government of
Zambia once again cited socio-economic reasons when they introduced a
windfall tax on mining companies.175 The government of Zambia proceeded
to amend the favourable tax regime that mining companies had previously
enjoyed, when copper prices rose from $1,779 per ton in 2003 to $6,438 per
ton in 2008.176
Similarly, when Venezuela nationalized its oil companies in the 1970s,
it also expressed concerns about the backbone of its economy being
dominated by foreign-owned interests.177 Governments may also
nationalize because they are seeking to correct what they perceive as a
colonial wrong.178 This was certainly the case when the Zimbabwean
government nationalized white-owned farms.179 Although Zimbabwean
farm nationalization does not deal with a concession per se, it underscores
INT’L L. & POLICY 183, 188 (1994).
170 Maarten H. Muller, Compensation for Nationalization: A North-South Dialogue, 19
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 35, 45 (1981). See also Margot E. Salomon, From NIEO to Now
and the Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice, 62 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 31, 36-46 (2013);
Nordine Ait-Laoussine & John Gault, Nationalization, Privatization and Diversification, 10
J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 43 (2017).
171 Muller, supra note 170.
172 Daniel Limpitlaw, Nationalization and Mining: Lessons from Zambia, 111 J. S. AFR.
INST. MINING & METALLURGY 737, 737 (2011).
173 Id.
174 Sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi, Mineral Taxation and Resource Nationalism in Zambia,
S. AFR. J. POL’Y & DEV. 6, 10 (2015).
175 See generally NG’AMBI, supra note 161.
176 Sangwani Ng’ambi, Stabilization Clauses and the Zambian Windfall Tax, 1 ZAM.
SOC. SCI. J. 107, 113 (2011).
177 Felix P. Rossi-Guerrero, The Transition from Private to Public Control in the
Venezuelan Petroleum Industry, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 475, 482 (1976).
178 See Dunia Zongwe, The Contribution of Campbell v. Zimbabwe to the Foreign
Investment Law on Expropriations, 2 NAMIB. L. J. 31 (2010).
179 Id.
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the contention that when a government expropriates property or breaches a
concession, it does not necessarily do so for the purposes of wealth
maximization. That the State must pay future profits may make it more
onerous to pursue those goals. Given this, States need some form of
flexibility when dealing with “legitimate changes and circumstances.”180
The rules, as they stand, do not permit the State that flexibility.
In sum, the efficient breach theory posits that parties can breach a
contract and pay damages in lieu of performance if doing so would be
economically efficient. At the international level, compensation rather than
specific performance is the dominant remedy. Once the State unilaterally
terminates a concession agreement, it must compensate any related
investor. The compensation package invariably includes lost future profits.
If the State breaches an agreement, compensates the investor and still
makes a profit after doing so, it may have acted efficiently.
In this respect, the international investment law rules promote
efficiency, as prescribed under the efficient breach theory. However, the
efficient breach theory ignores that not all parties to a contract are
necessarily concerned with wealth maximization. Thus, while the rules on
compensation under international investment law promote efficiency, they
do not give the host State the sufficient flexibility needed in order to pursue
legitimate public functions.
4.0 CONCLUSION
When a State unilaterally abrogates its contractual obligations, it is
under a duty to compensate the investor. Damages aim to restore the
investor to the position they would have been in had the breach not taken
place. This not only includes damnum emergens, it also includes lucrum
cessans. Such damages are awarded regardless of whether the taking is
deemed legal or illegal by arbitral tribunals.
The rules relating to compensation under international investment law
promote efficiency because they prevent governments from unilaterally
abrogating contracts unless they can compensate the investor. This includes
lost future profits while retaining a net profit. The difficulty with payment
of future profits in the States’ case, however, is that it makes it more
onerous for the host State to pursue its legitimate public functions. States
usually cite socio-economic reasons for their termination, rather than
simply maximizing profits as espoused under the efficient breach theory.
This can be contrasted with commercial actors whose only concern is
making money.
Therefore, there is a limitation to the efficient breach theory, in that it
focuses more on wealth maximization. This presupposes that contract law
only governs activities of profit-maximizing market participants. This is not
180
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quite the case in international investment law. On the one hand, there is a
private entity looking to make profit. On the other, we have the State,
whose objectives are wider than just commercial. In this sense, one would
argue that whilst international investment law promotes efficiency, it does
not provide the States with sufficient flexibility to pursue its legitimate
public objectives, when it breaches agreements.
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